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The Problem of Universal Salvation 
in the Theology of Emil Brunner
Richard Paul Cumming
This article examines the approach of the twentieth-century dialectical 
theologian, Emil Brunner (1889–1966), to the perennial theological problem of 
the possibility of universal salvation, a topic which has occupied the reflections 
of Christopher Morse, whose scholarship we honor in the present volume.  Emil 
Brunner was Professor of Systematic and Practical Theology at the University 
of Zürich and an eminent and prolific theologian in his own right.  However, 
although Brunner exerted considerably greater influence than Barth upon the 
contemporaneous North American theological scene,1 he is known today primarily 
for his dispute with Barth over the question of natural theology.2  In light of the 
fact that Brunner’s thought has been largely neglected since the 1930s, whereas 
the study of Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics still represents a rite of passage in the 
context of theological formation, one often finds that where Brunner is men-
tioned at all, it is habitually in the context of Barth’s theology, and consequently 
Brunner’s own theology has generally been interpreted in the shadow of Barth’s 
titanic enterprise.  Indeed, at certain points, Brunner himself lends credibility to 
this hermeneutical approach to his work.3  In the present article, however, I shall 
attempt to exposit Brunner’s position for itself, and not primarily in terms of its 
engagement with Barth.4
In this article, I shall first sketch the principal aspects of Augustine’s ap-
proach to the problem of universal salvation in order to provide a basic context for 
Brunner’s approach to the topic.  I shall then outline Brunner’s approach to the 
problem, following which I shall remark both upon the ways in which Brunner’s 
solution can be understood as a development upon that of Augustine and upon 
some of the theological problems it raises.
1 I. John Hesselink, “Emil Brunner: A Centennial Perspective,” Christian Century, Decem-
ber 13 1989: 1171.  I should like to express my appreciation to the Bourse d’excellence pour étudiants 
étrangers program of the Quebec Ministry of Education’s Natural Science and Technology Research 
Council and to the Richard H. Tomlinson Doctoral Fellowship program of McGill University for the 
funding which made this research possible.
2 Barth is notorious for the concise title of his response to Brunner, ‘Nein.’  Interestingly, 
Trevor Hart is of the opinion that Barth misunderstood Brunner on the question of natural theology, 
see Trevor Hart, “A Capacity for Ambiguity? The Barth-Brunner debate revisited,” Tyndale Bulletin 
44/2 (1993): 289–305.
3 See Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics Vol. I., trans. Olive Wyon 
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), 135 where he writes that “it is very cheering to note that Karl 
Barth…has come to the same conclusion.”
4 Hayes has already pursued an examination of Brunner’s critique of Barth’s approach to the 
problem of universal salvation in his S.T.M. thesis on this topic.  See Stephen Andrew Hayes, Emil 
Brunner’s Criticism of Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Election, S.T.M. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 
1970 (unpublished manuscript in McLennan Library, McGill University, Montreal).
augustInE of hIppo’s approach to thE proBlEm of unIVErsal salVatIon In City 
of god
The possibility of the salvation of those outside the visible body of the 
Church is a question which has occupied Christian theologians since at least the 
subapostolic era.  This was at no point a settled topic, and among the Church 
Fathers themselves theological positions on the topic varied widely.  Origen of 
Alexandria, for example, suggested in On First Principles that all intelligent beings 
would inevitably attain to salvation as a function of the reconciliatory dynamic 
of the cosmic order, according to which Christ is destined to include all rational 
creation within himself.5  In contrast, Fulgentius of Ruspe, widely characterized 
as one of Augustine of Hippo’s theological successors, took a much stricter line in 
his To Peter on the Faith, in which he averred that “with the exception of those who 
are baptized in their own blood for the name of Christ,”6 who by their baptism of 
blood are incorporated into the Catholic Church,7 no one outside the visible com-
munion of the Catholic Church can be saved.8  Accordingly, Fulgentius exhorted 
his interlocutor to “hold most firmly and never doubt that not only all pagans but 
also all Jews and all heretics and schismatics who finish this present life outside the 
Catholic Church will go ‘into eternal fire which has been prepared for the Devil 
and his angels.’”9  According to Fulgentius, whoever does not profess and is not in-
corporated into the true Church, “even if he shed his blood for the name of Christ, 
can never be saved.”10 
In the Middle Ages, Fulgentius’s To Peter on the Faith was “widely attributed 
to St. Augustine.”11  Augustine himself, however, occupies a mediating position 
between the polarized positions of Origen and Fulgentius.  Augustine discusses the 
salvation of those outside the visible Church in Book XVIII of City of God, where 
he acknowledges the operation of salvific grace outside the “house of Israel” before 
the coming of Christ, writing that “there have been some men who belonged, not 
by earthly but by heavenly fellowship, to the true Israelites, the citizens of the su-
pernal fatherland,” and asserting that it is absurd to claim otherwise.12  Augustine 
adduces the example of Job to counter those who reject the possibility of salvation 
outside Israel, interpreting Job typologically as the righteous and pious Gentile 
whose presence in the biblical testimony was directly intended “by the dispensa-
tion of divine providence that from this one man we should know that there could 
also be men of other nations who lived according to God, and were pleasing to 
5 Origen of Alexandria, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth & intro. Henri de 
Lubac (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 242–243; 248.
6 Fulgentius of Ruspe, Selected Works, trans. Robert B. Eno (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997), 101.
7 Fulgentius, Selected Works, 88.
8 Fulgentius, Selected Works, 101.
9 Fulgentius, Selected Works, 104.  Emphasis mine.
10 Fulgentius, Selected Works, 104.  Emphasis mine.
11 Eno in Fulgentius, Selected Works, 59.
12 Augustine of Hippo, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. & trans. R. W. Dyson (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 893.  Italics mine.
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Him, as belonging to this spiritual Jerusalem.”13  Another example, the Sibyl of Er-
ythrae, “speaks out against such [pagan] gods and their worshippers so forcefully 
that she is, it seems, to be included among those who belong to the City of God.”14  
According to Augustine, this affirmation of the possibility of salvation outside the 
historical community of faith can be understood to be consonant with the solo 
Christo of the Christian faith, since “it is not to be believed…that this was granted 
to anyone unless he had received a divine revelation of ‘the one Mediator between 
God and men, the man Christ Jesus.’”15  This possibility, moreover, is limited to 
this life, since after death one’s destiny is fixed: if one has remained “impenitent” 
to the point of death, one is to be counted “as one of the devil’s faction.”16
We have seen that Augustine affirms the possibility of salvation outside the 
visible body of Israel.  His position on the possibility of universal salvation, how-
ever, is uncompromisingly negative.  In Book XXI of his City of God, Augustine 
indicates some degree of familiarity with the proposition that all human beings, 
wicked as well as good, will be saved by virtue of the divine mercy, noting that 
there are some Christians who harbor hope for this outcome.  While Augustine 
views these Christians as well-meaning but deluded, referring to them as “merciful 
brethren of ours,”17 he nevertheless accuses them of being misled and inconsistent.  
According to Augustine, the universalists are misled because they inadvertently 
offend God by depriving him of his capacity to judge and condemn the wicked.18  
Furthermore, they are inconsistent because, whereas their argument that God 
will be merciful on all the wicked relies upon the proposition that “this opinion 
[universal human salvation] is good and true because it is merciful,” they do not 
take this proposition to its logical conclusion: the salvation of the fallen angels.  As 
Augustine writes: “Why…does this stream of mercy flow far enough to encompass 
the whole human race and then dry up as soon as it reaches the angels?  Yet those 
whose belief we are here discussing do not venture to extend their mercy beyond 
human beings, so as to provide even for the redemption of the devil himself,” a 
possibility which Augustine declares to be quite inconceivable, since it represents 
“a distortion of the righteous words of God.”19  Augustine is convinced that the 
impossibility of both universal human salvation and the salvation of the fallen 
angels is enshrined in Scripture; and that to propose the possibility of universal 
human salvation would entail that “the sentence of God pronounced on all the 
wicked, angels as well as men, [must] be true in the case of angels but false in 
that of men,” meaning that “the conjectures of men will be worth more than the 
word of God.”20  This does not entail, however, that all the wicked are necessarily 
condemned, for there are certain sins “which impede us in the attainment of the 
13 Augustine, City of God, 893.
14 Augustine, City of God, 851.
15 Augustine, City of God, 894.
16 Augustine, City of God, 1086.
17 Augustine, City of God, 1076.
18 Augustine, City of God, 1078–1080.
19 Augustine, City of God, 1077.
20 Augustine, City of God, 1084.
kingdom of God but which can nonetheless find pardon,” not through our own 
conversion, but “through the merits of holy friends.”21
We have seen that Augustine affirms the possibility and actuality of salvation 
outside the historical community of faith, but denies emphatically the possibility 
of universal salvation.  One of the anticipable objections to Augustine’s position, 
which, as we shall see, is of especial relevance to Brunner’s approach, is that the 
concept of divine judgment attributes mutable states to God.  Augustine addresses 
this objection in Book XV, where he argues that “God’s anger is not a disturbance 
in the mind” and does not reflect mutability in God.22  According to Augustine, 
God’s action of saving or condemning a particular human being, insofar as it is 
linked with her own decision in history, either to love God or to love herself,23 
does not entail any modification of God’s will or disposition towards her: “this is 
only the application of His immutable plan to mutable things,”24 his immutable 
plan being to create good and to “bring forth [good] from…evil.”25  Accordingly, 
Augustine explains in Book IX that biblical texts which speak of God’s anger are 
not to be interpreted as indicating a change in God himself: “according to the 
Scriptures, God Himself is angered; yet He is not disturbed by any passion.  For 
this word is used to indicate the effect of His vengeance, rather than any disturbance 
to which He is subject.”26  In Book I, Augustine explains how this is possible, using 
the example of a fire to articulate how it is possible for singular divine providence 
to give rise to various effects: he writes, “in the same fire, gold glows but chaff 
smokes, and under the same flail straw is crushed and grain purified…by the same 
token, when one and the same force falls upon the good and the wicked, the former 
are purged and purified but the latter damned, ruined and destroyed.”27
BrunnEr’s approach to thE proBlEm of unIVErsal salVatIon (1): BrunnEr’s Doc-
trInE of thE hIstorIcIty of faIth anD thE possIBIlIty of unIVErsal salVatIon
We have seen how Augustine affirms the possibility of salvation outside the 
visible Church while denying the possibility of universal salvation.  One of the 
interesting aspects of Brunner’s approach to the topic is the fact that his position 
represents a complete inversion of Augustine’s position: according to Brunner, the 
act of justifying faith eventuates only within the historical community of faith, but 
this does not preclude the possibility of universal salvation.
According to Brunner, Jesus Christ is the event of the in-breaking of eternity 
into history, an in-breaking which constitutes the activating principle of faith: 
21 Augustine, City of God, 1104–1105.
22 Augustine, City of God, 686.
23 Augustine, City of God, 632–633.
24 Augustine, City of God, 686.
25 Augustine, City of God, 604.
26 Augustine, City of God, 366.
27 Augustine, City of God, 12.
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Christians believe in Jesus Christ because Jesus really is the Christ, the one who 
brings humanity into “contact with reality,” which, for Brunner, is the very essence 
of faith.28  As he writes: “Faith in Jesus Christ is living contact with reality, pure 
and simple; but it is certainly contact with reality of a special kind, and therefore 
it is also a way of coming into contact with reality which is itself of a peculiar 
character.”29  For Brunner, the distinguishing characteristic of this mode of contact 
with reality consists in the fact that the type of understanding manifested in 
the act of faith is a function not of the active understanding but of the receptive 
understanding: faith is an act of understanding by which the believer is grasped 
by the reality of Jesus Christ.30  Therefore, the essence of this faith is not a series of 
propositional affirmations.  Rather, it is encounter with Jesus Christ: “faith is not 
primarily the acceptance of a dogma, but an ‘existential’ personal happening….
It is the self-surrender of our own person and its claim, its selfish will, to the God 
who encounters it in Christ.  Faith is the most personal act conceivable, the surren-
der of self to the Redeemer who surrenders Himself.  Faith in Jesus Christ is a total 
transformation of existence.”31  
Brunner claims, following Augustine, that it is only in the “encounter with 
Jesus Christ” that the human being can recognize her own fallen state and be 
converted: outside the sphere of this encounter with Jesus Christ, humanity “uses 
religion or morals to protect him[self] against the judgment of God.”32  Unlike 
Augustine, however, Brunner asserts that this faith-generating encounter can only 
take place within the context of the historical community of faith, the Ekklesia, 
which is the instrument of God’s self-communication: “the Lord uses its Word of 
witness to continue His work of self-communication.”33  Brunner argues that, be-
cause humanity is an historical being, the generation of human faith can only take 
place in history, “for apart from real history…there is no reality that in the strict 
sense transforms existence.”34  For this reason, Jesus Christ does not encounter the 
individual human being in an ahistorical fashion, but only by means of historical 
mediation.  According to Brunner, this historical mediation is the apostolic wit-
ness of the Ekklesia, the “brotherhood resulting from faith in Christ.”35  It is only 
through the apostolic witness of the Ekklesia that the act of faith, the encounter in 
which one is grasped by the reality of Jesus Christ, takes place.  As he states, “We 
can hear this message only through the witnessing Word of the witnesses.  Thus 
the Word which creates faith is at the same time God’s Word and man’s word, 
Word of the Spirit, and paradosis, tradition.  The Word about Christ is at the same 
time spiritual and historical.  This character refers back to the Incarnation of the 
28 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics Vol. II, trans. 
Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), 241.
29 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 241.
30 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 242.
31 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and the Consummation: Dog-
matics III, trans. David Cairns & T. H. L. Parker (London: Lutterworth Press, 1962), 371.
32 Brunner, Dogmatics III¸ 150–151.
33 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 137–138.
34 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 143.
35 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 128.
Word.”36  The apostles encountered and received Christ directly, but “He does not 
make Himself known to us in the same way [as the apostles].  He makes Himself 
known to us through the collective witness of the Apostles.”37  Therefore, there 
is no room for a theology of a faith abstracted from the historical community, 
since “this Word can awaken true only when it is proclaimed by the Ekklesia, the 
brotherhood, in which alone it is vitally present.”38  “True faith is indivisibly both” 
invisible and visible, “[invisible] faith in Christ and [visible] existence in Christ.”39
Outside the sphere of faith, which is the sphere of the historical community 
of faith, the fraternal Ekklesia, there is no salvation: faith is the condition of sal-
vation.40  The offer of salvation in Jesus Christ applies only to those who believe,41 
and who are thereby brought into the Ekklesia: “faith, precisely in its fully devel-
oped form as justifying faith, is always at once both individual faith and the faith 
which creates the Ekklesia as a brotherhood in Christ.”42  As for those outside the 
visible Ekklesia, “just as we ought to know that God alone in Jesus Christ is the 
God of Grace, and outside of Jesus Christ the God of Wrath, so ought we to know 
that He is only gracious to him who believes, but that He is not so to him who is 
outside the sphere of faith.” 43  In this regard, Brunner concedes that many who 
profess non-Christian belief systems may often show a certain reverence for God, 
but he argues that their rejection of the Christian faith proclaimed by the Ekklesia 
demonstrates that they have not surrendered themselves completely to the loving 
dominion of God, desiring instead to pursue a relationship with God on their own 
terms.  They do not acknowledge their total dependence upon God but instead 
affirm their own autonomy insofar as they use their religion as an instrument to 
affirm their self-contrived standing before God.44  
At first sight, this is a far less inclusive soteriological model than Augustine’s, 
since it does not allow for the possibility of salvation outside the context of the 
historical encounter of the human being with Jesus Christ through the witness 
of his Ekklesia.  Brunner’s adoption of this position, however, does not entail the 
impossibility of universal salvation.  In fact, for Brunner, the point of the reality 
of exclusion and punishment for those who do not believe is to bring the human 
being to the event of decision, where she is required to decide for or against God.  
Without the threat of exclusion and punishment, the human being’s decision for 
or against God has no real impact upon her destiny, and the human being is thus 
dehumanized by being deprived of her responsibility for her own ontological orien-
tation, be it for or against God.45  Because the human being is a free and respon-
36 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 174–175.
37 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 371.
38 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 135.  Emphasis mine.
39 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 135–136.
40 Cf. Brunner, Dogmatics I, 319.
41 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 319.
42 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 224.  Emphasis mine.
43 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 353.
44 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 147–148.
45 Brunner, Dogmatics I¸  334; 351.
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sible creature, God respects the decision of the human being, either to accept or to 
reject him: “whoever excludes himself, is excluded; he who does not allow himself 
to be included, is not included.  But he who allows himself to be included, he who 
believes, is elect.”46
Does this mean that there are actually people who do decide definitively 
against God, rejecting the offer of grace, and thereby excluding themselves from 
the salvific grace of God?  Brunner’s response to this question is: not necessarily.  
He states that, when we speak of the fate of unbelievers, we should always qualify 
them as unbelievers “as yet,” since “everyone who believes has passed from unbelief 
to belief” and therefore it is possible that the one who is now an unbeliever may 
become a believer.47  According to Brunner, therefore, the state of unbelief has a 
certain fluidity and those who are at present “vessels of wrath” may become “the 
‘saved’ at the end of the ages.”48  Brunner acknowledges that there are biblical pas-
sages with universalistic connotations as well as biblical passages which narrate the 
condemnation to be endured by those who do not believe: Brunner’s attitude to 
these two divergent scriptural strands is to affirm that both are the Word of God 
and constitute a “challenge” to decision for faith, which does not necessarily imply 
that there are actually any people who are not saved.49  For this reason we cannot 
deny the possibility of universal salvation.50  
Given the fact that the preponderance of humanity does not profess the 
Christian faith, if it is the case that the justifying faith necessary for salvation is 
communicated only in the context of the historical encounter of the human being 
with the Ekklesia, how is universal salvation even a possibility?  Concerning this 
question, Brunner notes two hypotheses.  First, it is possible that the consumma-
tion of history is being deliberately delayed by God because humanity is not yet 
converted: “who will exclude the possibility that the postponement of the end of 
history is the expression of a divine concern for the unreadiness of mankind?”51  
Second, it is possible that one may be able to encounter Christ after death: 1 Peter 
3:19 records that Christ was vivified by the Holy Spirit and by his power “preached 
unto the Spirits in prison,” which for Brunner suggests that “the question whether 
the possibility of the decision of faith is limited to this earthly life…remains 
open.”52  This particular possibility of post-mortem encounter, is, we recall, pre-
cisely the one which Augustine had categorically excluded.  However, Brunner’s 
insistence upon the necessity of a personal encounter with and acceptance of Christ 
positions him to obviate Augustine’s objection to the possibility of universal salva-
tion; namely, that it detracts from God’s judgment upon the wicked.
46 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 320.  Emphasis in original.
47 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 416. Emphasis in original.
48 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 328–329.  Cf. 330.
49 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 422.  Cf. Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight (Lon-
don: Lutterworth Press, 1954), 183.
50 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 335.
51 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 400.
52 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 320.  Emphasis in original.
Affirming the possibility of universal salvation, Brunner nevertheless 
rejects the attempt to propose universal salvation as a theological doctrine.  He 
develops a number of arguments against the doctrine of universal salvation, to 
which I now turn.
BrunnEr’s approach to thE proBlEm of unIVErsal salVatIon (2): BrunnEr’s 
rEJEctIon of thE DoctrInE of unIVErsal salVatIon
Brunner adopts an attitude of overt suspicion towards the advocates of the 
doctrine of universal salvation: he considers this perspective to be heretical, and, 
in its modern incarnation, to be the result of the pernicious infiltration of “an 
optimistic self-glorifying picture of man.”53  As we have seen, Brunner is quite 
emphatic in his affirmation of the possibility of universal salvation.  Nevertheless, 
he disavows the attempt to develop a universalistic soteriology on the grounds 
that its dogmatization necessarily precludes “the other possibility” of damnation,54 
‘confiscating’ from God both his freedom to elect in Jesus Christ and to reject 
outside Jesus Christ.55
Brunner presents four principal arguments against the characterization of 
universal salvation as a doctrine (as opposed to a hypothetical possibility).  These 
are as follows: (1) the argument from Scripture; (2) the argument from doctrinal 
tradition; (3) the argument from human freedom; and (4) the argument from the 
separation of operations of the Father and Son.  We now consider these in turn.
The first principal argument in Brunner’s critique of the doctrine of uni-
versal salvation is that this doctrine departs from the “clear teaching of the New 
Testament”: for Brunner, to divest the New Testament message of all content 
referring to a “judgment of wrath” is an irresponsible “perversion of the Christian 
message of Salvation.”56  Brunner summarizes his interpretation of the biblical 
message thus: “the Bible does not speak of universal salvation, but, on the contrary, 
of judgment and of a two-fold destiny: salvation and doom,”57 adducing a list of 
New Testament texts which make reference to this judgment, and averring that 
the New Testament clearly contains this notion of final damnation for unbelievers; 
and that, in departing from this, the universalist proposes “a fundamental perver-
sion of the Christian message of salvation.”58
The second principal argument that Brunner develops is an argument from 
the history of doctrine.  Brunner appeals to the normativity of the doctrinal tradi-
tion of the Church, and in his critique of Karl Barth’s doctrine of election, which 
he perceives as tending towards a universalistic soteriology, he charges Barth with 
53 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 334.
54 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 335.
55 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 314.
56 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349.
57 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 352.
58 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349.
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adopting a position “in absolute opposition...to the whole ecclesiastical tradition.”59  
This argument from tradition is developed further in Brunner’s appendix on 
apokatastasis, where he offers an abbreviated history of universalistic soteriological 
paradigms, stating that “the Church as a whole has recognised [them] as a heresy.”  
Brunner remarks that universalistic soteriological paradigms were heavily influ-
enced by Platonist thought in antiquity, condemned by the Council of Constan-
tinople, and only reacquired popularity from the Reformation era onwards, where 
they were adopted by Anabaptists, “‘enlightened’ thinkers” and, later, by liberal 
theologians like Schleiermacher.  Completing his potted history of the doctrine 
of universal salvation in Christian tradition, Brunner concludes laconically: “this 
genealogy gives food for thought.”60  Without disclosing precisely what “food for 
thought” Brunner has in mind, from the tone of his discourse it is abundantly 
evident that he is endeavoring to generate an association between universalistic 
soteriology and theological heresy, and his implication is that it is therefore only 
“natural” that one should align oneself to such a soteriological paradigm if one has 
no compunction about infidelity to the doctrine of the church as it has been trans-
mitted and sustained throughout the ages, substituting, as Schleiermacher did, a 
“monistic type of thought” for the authentic proclamation of the New Testament.61
The third objection that Brunner raises to the doctrine of universal salva-
tion relates to the human faculty of decision, to which we have already alluded: 
according to Brunner, a universalistic soteriology places exclusive emphasis on 
the divine election of humanity at the expense of the human being’s capacity for 
decision.  This soteriological paradigm, which he discerns in Barth’s theology 
and which he terms “objectivism,” orients its focus exclusively onto the objective 
fact of divine salvific revelatory agency in Jesus Christ, considering the subjective 
element in the history of salvation, namely, the appropriation of and integration 
into this history of salvation through faith, to be redundant.62  The salient point of 
such a soteriological model is that God has decided for humanity and the gravity 
of humanity’s rejection of this decision in the act of unbelief is underemphasized 
to the point of immateriality: “the result is that the real decision only takes place 
in the objective sphere, and not in the subjective sphere.  Thus: the decision has 
been made in Jesus Christ—for all men.  Whether they know it or not, believe it 
or not, is not so important.  The main point is that they are saved.”63  To Brunner, 
this line of argument is suspicious as it does not allow “any room for man to make 
a real decision,”64 and he entertains similar reservations concerning the Calvinistic 
59 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349.  Tradition is a normative source secondary to scripture, because 
tradition is of a lesser standing than scripture, see Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian 
Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946), 
126.
60 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 352–353.
61 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 353.
62 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349–350.
63 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 351.
64 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 351.
doctrine of double predestination.65  According to Brunner, there is no salvation 
without faith: salvation is the domain of those who have, in response to the call 
of Christ, made the concrete decision of faith.  In order to elucidate this point, 
Brunner applies Luther’s radical contrast between the state of faith and the state 
of unbelief, arguing that the basis of the differentiation between the two states of 
existence is categorizable in terms of the dependence-autonomy polarity.  Unbe-
lief is characterized as autonomy: it is an attempt to live by and for oneself, to be 
one’s “own master,” in which one has a sense of one’s own superiority and domin-
ion over nature and other human beings.66  But this is antithetical to our true 
determination as human beings, to be found in “wholeness” and fellowship: the 
integrity of the human being is to be found in the acceptance of the Word of God, 
and “the autonomous man is in the strict sense of the word the inhuman man” 
because he “misses his chance of achieving his humanity...by missing his integra-
tion at the point where alone it can happen—namely in the Word of God.”67  The 
Word of God, Jesus Christ, encounters the human being historically,68 and in this 
encounter the self-seeking autonomous human being is confronted by the reality of 
its limitations and ultimate dependence on God, and it is called to affirm its true 
nature; that is, to belong to God.69  We are all made consciously cognizant of our 
subterranean awareness of our rebellion against God in the state of unbelief,70 and 
in the act of faith we respond to the call of Jesus Christ, accepting the objective 
truth of his lordship over us.  “Only in faith is man’s being known as a being of the 
self received from the Thou...only thus has our self come to its true self...because 
the Lord encountered it in history in His challenging claim and the bestowal of 
His assurance...[through which] its true being and its true humanity are given to 
it.  For only as a loving self—instead of a dominating, self-assertive self—can it be 
truly human...It cannot become a loving self by its own efforts, but only because 
it is ‘first loved.’”71  In the revelation-event, the human being is presented with 
a vision of reality in Christ, who rescues us “from the wrath of God,”72 and the 
“absolute free grace of God, purely generous love...applies to all in so far as they 
believe.  Whoever excludes himself, is excluded...But he who allows himself to be 
included, he who believes, is ‘elect.’”73  Universalism is a form of “cheap grace” 
since it does not accept the destiny-forming character of the responsible decision of 
the individual not to believe and not to be elect.74
65 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 333.
66 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 140–143; 146.
67 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 146.  Emphasis mine.
68 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 142.
69 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 142 & 150.
70 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 150.
71 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 145.
72 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 309.  See 311 for emphasis on the individual character of this 
acceptance.
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In connection with, and as a consequence of, this accentuation of the sub-
jective-receptive dimension of the economy of salvation, Brunner distances himself 
from the doctrine of infant baptism.  Brunner questions the value of baptism itself, 
but he affirms that whatever salvific function it may have, its efficacy is undoubt-
edly contingent upon faith.75  He claims that, for Paul, baptism was extrinsic 
to the faithful response of the human being to God; and that Paul’s teaching is 
irreconcilable with the practice of infant baptism.76  Consequently, Brunner pro-
nounces his unambiguous theological sympathies with the Anabaptists on this is-
sue, contending that the real reason for their ecclesiastical marginalization was the 
inextricable connection between the doctrine of infant baptism and the doctrine of 
the state church.77  Implicit in this assertion is the notion that, with the emergence 
of a secular state, infant baptism serves no discernible purpose, a conclusion which 
Brunner embraces, writing that “men of today, at least, have no time for a Church 
which on the one side indiscriminately baptizes every child...and on the other side 
preaches justification by faith alone.”78  In other words, baptism, insofar as it is 
conceived in soteriological perspective, must for Brunner express the individual’s 
response in faith.
For Brunner, the decision of a human individual for God is grounded in 
the act of God in his self-revelation in Jesus Christ, which issues from his gracious 
love for humanity and desire to be with human beings, and, potentially (subject 
to the universal reception of Jesus Christ in faith), with all humanity.  The salient 
feature of this soteriological paradigm, and the one which introduces us to Brun-
ner’s fourth major objection, is the relationship between the Father and the Son 
in Brunner’s theology.  Brunner’s fourth principal objection to the doctrine of 
universal salvation is that it depends upon a Christomonism which neglects the 
complex internal dynamic of the relations between the Father and the Son.79  For 
Brunner, it is correct to state that God loves humanity in Christ; that is to say, 
when as Christians we encounter God through Jesus Christ, we meet the God 
of reconciling love who imparts himself to us through the mediation of Jesus 
Christ.80  However, God is not only a God of reconciling love.  Brunner repudiates 
the classical Trinitarian formulation opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa (‘the exte-
rior works of the Trinity are indivisible’),81 arguing that the Father has allocated 
certain reconciling functions to the Son but has also reserved the functions of 
75 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 55.
76 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 54.
77 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 56.
78 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 98.  Brunner also claims to leave the question of infant baptism 
open (cf. 78); there is, however, no reason whatsoever to suggest that he actually does so.  
79 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 315.
80 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 199 & 214.
81 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 232–234.  “There are works of the Father, which are most certainly 
not the works of the Son.”  Brunner does claim that the classical formula opera trinitatis ad extra sunt 
indivisa “must…be used with extreme caution,” which would appear to suggest a qualified approval 
of the formula; however, in his procedure it is beyond dispute that Brunner completely abandons this 
cardinal dogmatic principle.
judgment and condemnation to himself.82  This enables him to construct a concept 
of God which accounts for both the love of God in Jesus Christ and God’s wrath 
outside Jesus Christ.  Let us consider this further.
In his articulation of the operational separation of the Father and the Son, 
Brunner relies extensively on Luther’s distinction between the deus revelatus (‘re-
vealed God’) and the deus absconditus (‘hidden God’): the deus revelatus designates 
the loving God as he has revealed himself in Jesus Christ; whereas the deus abscon-
ditus designates the wrathful God, the Father as he is in himself, distinct from his 
act of self-revelation, and distinct from the Son.  We encounter this wrathful God 
if we seek God outside of Christ.83  Brunner also describes these two modalities of 
divine agency by means of Luther’s concepts of the deus nudus (‘the naked God’) 
and the deus velatus (‘the veiled God’): we are unable to experience the magnifi-
cence of God in itself, so in revelation his “terrible majesty is graciously veiled...
He makes Himself finite and knowable for our sakes.”84  There is a fundamental 
conceptual unity between these two polarities: the deus nudus is the deus abscondi-
tus and the deus velatus is the deus revelatus; the God who does not reveal himself is 
the God of naked majesty and power, and the God who does reveal himself is the 
one who reveals himself in mystery, “in this veiled form as love.”85
One might enquire how God can dispose himself in two radically disjunc-
tive ways towards his creation, and it is this distinction between the deus revelatus 
and the deus absconditus that underpins Brunner’s schematization of the divine 
‘disposition’ towards the world.  God is the Holy One, that is, the separate, exalted 
one.86  In his act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ, his holiness attaches itself to, 
and is concretely expressed as, Love: when the Father has dealings with the world 
in and through Jesus Christ, the love-modality of his holiness is operative.87  This 
love-modality of the divine self-disposition towards humanity in revelation in 
Jesus Christ is not discontinuous with the being of the Father in himself but rather 
constitutes the concrete expression of the being of the Father: “God the Father is 
really He who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ.  When Jesus Christ, in His Holy 
and Merciful authority, speaks to us as ‘I,’ the Holy and Merciful God Himself is 
really speaking to us.  God is the One who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ as the 
God for us.  The love of Jesus is really the love of God.  Thus God is not merely 
the Loving One in His relation to us, but in Himself He is Love.”88  On the other 
hand, when the Father has dealings with the world outside of this revelation in 
Jesus Christ, his holiness attaches itself to wrath. The divine work of salvation is 
God’s opus proprium (‘own work’) and his work of wrath is his opus alienum (‘other 
82 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 232.
83 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 170.
84 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 171.
85 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 172.
86 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 158–160.
87 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 353.
88 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 227–228.
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work’ or ‘alien work’) which he undertakes “cogente malititia hominum” (‘in light 
of human evil’); that is, in response to the rejection of his loving dominion which 
unbelief entails.89  In the case of the love-modality of the divine self-disposition in 
revelation, i.e., in his opus proprium, God reveals himself as he really is, but in this 
opus alienum, we do not have a real encounter with God, and we do not see God 
as he really is.90  In this connection, Brunner approvingly cites Luther’s remarks 
attributing the operation of the divine wrath to the obstinacy of human unbelief: 
“he must make use of his sword...[to] crush those who try to resist his rule and his 
peaceful government, or to do harm to his people.  But in his hall and in his castle 
there is nothing but mercy and love.”91
To summarize the principal elements of Brunner’s critique of universalistic 
soteriology: according to Brunner, a theology of universal salvation (1) contradicts 
the message of the Bible; (2) departs from the doctrinal tradition of the Church; 
(3) results in an objectivism which does not give due emphasis to the responsibil-
ity of the human in the shaping of its destiny before God; and (4) does not take 
account of the separation of operations of the Father and the Son.
DIscussIon
There is a great deal about Brunner’s position which is to be commended.  I 
have already noted how Brunner’s position represents an inversion of Augustine’s 
position, and this inversion is significant because it attempts to do justice to the 
historicity of human experience.  Brunner’s emphasis upon the historical media-
tion of faith through the Ekklesia follows directly from the affirmation of the 
historicity of the human being, avoiding the atomized conception of grace which 
conceives of grace embracing the atomized individual human being in abstraction 
from her situation in the world.  Such an atomized conception of faith leads to an 
atomized conception of salvation, which does not take adequate cognizance of the 
fact that in the redemption of humanity Jesus Christ calls the human being not 
into a state of individual enrapturement but into his own communal, corporate re-
ality which exists concretely in the world as the Kingdom of God, and the intrinsi-
cally social character of the Christian vocation is key to Brunner’s understanding 
of the Kingdom of God: “The final realization of His will is the coming of His 
Kingdom, the coming of that which brings humanity and history to their consum-
mation.  This is the basic content of the word basileia tou theou—God’s kingly 
rule…The sovereignty of God is present in the Person of Jesus Christ.  The realm 
where Christ’s sovereignty is immediately exercised is the Ekklesia, meaning the 
fellowship of those who have their new life in Christ…Life in the Spirit is above 
all life in agape—life in a love that is not merely enjoined upon us and of which we 
are conscious only that it is obligatory, but a present life in the love which through 
89 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 230.
90 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 180.
91 Luther in Brunner, Dogmatics I, 174.
faith in Christ has become a reality in the life of the Ekklesia brotherhood.  For 
through this faith man is changed from one who lives for himself into one who 
lives for God and his brother.” 92
Brunner’s third chief argument against universalism, according to which 
the doctrine of universal salvation divests humanity of its charge to responsibility, 
represents a clear corrective to the objectivism which Brunner justifiably detects 
in Barth’s earlier writings.  An objectivist soteriology, as Brunner notes, concen-
trates entirely on the objective character of the Christ-event and does not factor in 
the subjective response as a co-determinant in the salvation history of the human 
being, which inevitably detracts from the freedom of humanity.  Brunner seeks to 
safeguard the human capacity “to make a real decision,”93 and he argues that any 
doctrine of universalism or predestination of necessity sacrifices this capacity.94  
This element of Brunner’s argumentation is, in my opinion, both the strongest one 
and the one which exhibits the most theological coherence as well as consistency 
with his own theological method.  Furthermore, it is plausible that Barth, at whom 
this criticism was primarily directed, adjusted his quasi-universalistic framework in 
his later theology to take account of Brunner’s objection, acknowledging that the 
doctrine of universal salvation trivializes the threat of damnation which human-
ity faces.95  For the later Barth, in the history of the salvation of humanity there is 
a subjective determination (sinfulness) which becomes realigned in the act of the 
faith in concert with the objective determination of the human being (obedience), 
and which is the destiny of humanity, but which may or may not be realized.96
Nevertheless, there are a number of reservations about Brunner’s critique 
of the doctrine of universal salvation related to its consistency with his overarch-
ing theological method and assessment of the order of normativity of doctrinal 
sources.  Furthermore, there are a number of concerns about the consequences of 
Brunner’s argumentation for the Christian doctrine of God.
For example, in his first argument against the doctrine of universal salva-
tion, Brunner remonstrates with the proponent of a universalistic soteriology 
on the basis that the doctrine of universal salvation departs from the scriptural 
testimony.  This alone, according to Brunner, should be perfectly sufficient to 
92 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 362–363.  On the other hand, in light of Brunner’s argument 
from doctrinal tradition against the doctrine of universal salvation, it is debatable whether Brunner’s 
concern for the modern concept of historicity merits his clear departure from the dogmatic tradition 
affirming the operation of salvific grace outside the bounds of the visible Church, a doctrine professed 
almost universally in the history of the dogmatic tradition.
93 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 351.
94 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 338.
95 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3-1, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, trans. G. W. Bromi-
ley (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1961), 477.
96 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3-1, 469 & 477–478.  There is room to object that 
Barth only permitted of a subordinate subjective determination and not the co-ordinate subjective 
determination upon which Brunner insisted.
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disarm the universalist: “there is one point which even they cannot gainsay: that 
in so doing Karl Barth is in absolute opposition, not only to the whole ecclesiasti-
cal tradition, but—and this alone is the final objection to it—to the clear teaching 
of the New Testament.”97  However, in his discussion of the question of universal 
salvation, Brunner presupposes (1) an absolute dogmatic normativity for the Bible, 
in addition to (2) a conceptual unity to the Bible in terms of its doctrinal message, 
neither of which has any foundation in his theological methodology, and which, 
if present, would by Brunner’s own logic commit him to an overt repudiation of 
the mere possibility of universal salvation, an assertion he does not venture. 
Brunner’s insistence upon the absolute normative character of scripture in his ap-
proach to the doctrine of universal salvation stands in tension with his theological 
method, because Brunner adopts a radically different orientation to scripture at 
the outset of his Dogmatics in the section entitled Prolegomena: The Basis and the 
Task of Dogmatics.  In this methodological section, Brunner does accept a scrip-
tural normativity, but he proceeds to repudiate the notion of “absolute” scriptural 
normativity, claiming that “the word of Scripture is not the final court of appeal, 
since Jesus Christ Himself alone is this ultimate authority.”98  Brunner offers a 
most instructive account of why this is the case: the Scriptures are not themselves 
the Word of God, but instead witness to the Word of God (Jesus Christ), who 
is “the real norm” of Christian doctrine.99  In the act of apostolic witness, Brun-
ner explains, the scriptures are composed by a circle of authors, all of whom are 
grasped by the reality of Jesus Christ and who report their encounter with this 
reality refractively, by which he means, according to the conceptual categories of 
their own limited, individual, historically conditioned perspectives.  Most signifi-
cantly, the apostles do not all share the same ‘catalogue’ of propositional insights, 
but only the existential insight that we have encountered God in the event of 
Jesus Christ, and Brunner is quite ardent in his insistence that there is no unified 
biblical system of doctrine, stating that “the doctrines of the New Testament to a 
great extent differ from one another,” from which he concludes that “the unity 
of the witness of the New Testament...lies solely and alone in Him, the One who 
is confessed, but not in the teaching of the witnesses.”100  “Only those who hold an 
obstinately doctrinaire view” can deny such differences among the teaching of the 
apostles in the New Testament.101
This has important repercussions for Brunner’s appeal to a monolithic 
biblical witness in his repudiation of the doctrine of universal salvation, since this 
appeal runs directly counter to the critical christocentric hermeneutic which he 
establishes in the methodological section of his work.  Furthermore, it is question-
able whether the Bible contains such a uniform teaching against universal salva-
tion, since Brunner himself repudiates the notion of a biblical consensus against 
97 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349.
98 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 47.
99 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 47.
100 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 46–47.  Emphasis mine.  Cf. 68.
101 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 248–249.
universal salvation when he states that there are “passages in the Bible which 
speak of universal salvation,” which nevertheless “failed to make an impact”; that 
is, which failed to acquire significant following in the early Church tradition.102  
Brunner’s argumentation, therefore, is demonstrably inconsistent in this context, 
because his Biblicist treatment of the question of universal salvation is antithetical 
to the hermeneutical approach he establishes and seeks to pursue in his Dogmatics.  
Therefore, if one wishes to remain faithful to Brunner’s overarching theological 
method and scriptural hermeneutic, one cannot accept Brunner’s claim that an 
alleged biblical consensus against universal salvation, whose existence Brunner 
himself repudiates at certain points, is by itself “the final objection” that dogmati-
cally invalidates the proposition.103
The second principal argument which Brunner deploys against the doctrine 
of universal salvation is the appeal to ecclesiastical tradition.  I have recounted how 
Brunner undertakes to cast a suspicious light upon the proponent of universalism 
by reference to its marginalized character within Christian doctrine throughout 
history, which he accomplishes by associating the doctrine with its heterodox 
antecedents.  Like his biblical appeal, this traditionalism represents a remarkable 
volte-face, discontinuous with his fundamental approach to theology.  To turn 
again to the Prolegomena of the Dogmatics, Brunner dismisses the Church’s claims 
to absolute dogmatic authority with great suspicion: dogma is not the “final au-
thority, forcing...[one] to suppress his own view entirely.”104  Brunner contends that 
the task of the theologian is to approach the dogma of the Church critically: “The 
Church should...[give] its recognized teachers...every facility for the critical exami-
nation of their present Confession of Faith, in order to extend its scope.  Thus the 
theologian stands on the threshold which both separates the existing Confession of 
Faith from the future, improved Confession, and also serves as the point of transi-
tion from the one to the other.  His point of departure is the existing Confession 
of faith; but before him there stands the ‘given’ revelation in the Scriptures.”105  
The theologian is charged not to accept dogmatic tradition uncritically, but to 
examine and to improve it: “there falls to dogmatics a second task, namely, that 
of critically examining the dogma which the Church lays before it, and, when neces-
sary, of providing a better dogma.”106  On the basis of this relativized concept of the 
normativity of Church doctrine and the mandate to pursue a critical examination 
of the dogmatic tradition, the doctrinal consensus of the Church against universal 
salvation does not constitute a conclusive argument, since it implicitly attributes 
a normative function to Church authority which Brunner would instinctively 
repudiate.107  It is true that, for Brunner, dogma has a certain normativity, but this 
102 Brunner, Dogmatics III, 422.
103 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 349.
104 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 53.
105 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 57–58.
106 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 80.
107 Unlike his argument from scripture, however, Brunner does not appear to claim that the 
argument from tradition represents a conclusive argument.
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is subordinate to the Bible which itself only has a relative normativity and which is 
bound by the absolute normativity of Jesus Christ.
This line of argument also has negative repercussions for Brunner’s theology 
as a whole, for, if we were to apply this argument from tradition to Brunner’s the-
ology, we could find at least six significant junctures at which his formulation of 
Christian doctrine could be deemed suspect: (1) the repudiation of infant baptism; 
(2) the repudiation of the identification of the Bible with the Word of God; (3) 
the repudiation of the Trinitarian formula, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa; 
(4) the affirmation of the mere possibility of universal salvation; (5) the repudiation 
of the possibility of justifying faith in history which does not bring the justified 
human being into the visible Church; and (6) the affirmation of the possibility of 
one’s accepting Christ after death.
Moving onto the concept of God which Brunner’s critique requires, Brun-
ner’s doctrine of the divine nature, or more accurately, its interior disposition, is a 
matter for serious concern.  Brunner, as I have indicated, rejects the classical for-
mulation opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa: he contends that this formulation 
leads inexorably to ‘Christian Monism,’ which for him is the basis of universalism, 
since it does not take account of the separation of functions in the interior disposi-
tion of God.  According to Brunner it is necessary “to make a clear distinction 
between the works which God does in and through the Son, from those which He 
does outside the Son of his Love.”108
Hayes points out that Brunner’s argument that the Father reserves all judg-
ment to himself is simply unscriptural, since there are biblical texts which clearly 
assign the faculty of judgment to the Son.  Furthermore, Hayes alludes to how this 
characterization of the relation between the Father and the Son could be prob-
lematic: “Brunner himself is, perhaps, on dangerous grounds in his criticism...is 
the ontological ground of this dialectic truly, as he believes, the separation of the 
Father from the Son?”109 It is the theological problems entailed by his characteriza-
tion of the internal relations of the Trinity that I now wish to explore.
The first observation that I should like to make is methodological: Brun-
ner’s conception of the separation of divine functions does not follow from his 
reflections on the nature of Trinitarian doctrine.  The doctrine of the Trinity 
is, for Brunner, a problem for dogmatic theology and is not to be considered an 
integral component of the faith: “it does not belong to the sphere of the Church’s 
message.”110  According to Brunner, it is only in the event of divine revelation that 
we catch a glimpse into the true nature of God as self-giving love: “the knowledge 
of God as our Father is the work of the Son, and is the counterpart of the truth 
108 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 233–234.
109 Hayes, Emil Brunner, 53.
110 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 206.
that Jesus is the Son of the Father.”111  Brunner argues that we should express re-
serve when reflecting upon the doctrine of the Trinity; and that “we must give up 
the endeavour to construct a doctrine of the relation between the ‘Trinitarian per-
sons,’” because this leads to tritheism.112 Brunner also objects to the undertaking 
on phenomenological grounds: he holds that “to make the mutual relation of the 
three persons within the Trinity a subject of theological discussion” is impossible 
as the pre-existence of Christ is “the final term” in the process of reflective faith.113  
Brunner’s procedure vis-à-vis reflection upon the Trinity, however, is in-
consistent with the theological methodology he prescribes.  On the one hand, he 
argues that reflecting upon the interior disposition of the Godhead, that is, upon 
their relations to one another, is a perilous undertaking, while on the other hand, 
he proceeds to conduct such a reflection by constructing a model of the relation 
between God and the world which is in essence predicated upon the tangential 
character of the relation between the Father and the Son: in certain cases, the Father 
acts through the Son, but in other cases, he acts alone.  Whether Brunner is aware 
of this or not, this characterization already claims a great deal about the interior 
disposition of the Godhead, and, tragically, although Brunner’s eschewal of the at-
tempt to construct a Trinitarian doctrine may have been grounded in reservations 
about the potentially tritheistic doctrine that would result, he ends up venturing 
into the same conceptual territory as the tritheist by separating the operations of the 
Father and Son. 
Moving on from purely methodological concerns, Brunner’s principal theo-
logical claim is that God the Father acts in concert with the Son to effect salvation 
but alone to effect damnation.  He grounds this, as we have already seen, in the 
notion of the divine as the Holy One, whose holiness attaches itself to love in Jesus 
Christ and to wrath outside Jesus Christ.  This position, I argue, is unsustainable 
on the basis of Brunner’s own concept of God.  Let us explore this.  For Brunner, 
holiness means separateness, distinctness, but this implies separation from some-
thing else: holiness entails that “He is Wholly Other against all else.”114  For this 
reason, “holiness [has to] merge into love”: love, concretized as the act of divine 
self-revelation, stems from the nature of God as the Holy One who wishes to be 
recognised as such by otherness and to share his very self with otherness.115  “The 
Love of God...[is] the fundamental nature of God.  God’s nature is the radiation of 
spiritual energy, an energy which is the will to impart himself.”116  If it is the case that 
the divine love, the self-impartative volition, is sourced in the nature of God itself, 
then what can one say of wrath?  Does this also have a source in God?  
111 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 208.
112 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 226–227.
113 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 225.
114 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 160.
115 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 190.
116 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 192.  Emphasis mine.
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Brunner claims that the Father exercises his wrath without the mediation 
of Jesus Christ in response to humanity’s failure to acknowledge his holiness.  
This raises a major dogmatic problem which, apart from its grounding in the 
separation of the divine functions, relies upon two mutually sustaining positions 
which are theologically suspect: the state of potency of God and the mutability 
of God.  Brunner argues that the Father’s act of condemnation of those outside 
Jesus Christ is an opus alienum, in which God does not encounter personally but 
impersonally through the judgment of the law.117  But it is debatable whether one 
can speak coherently of a dei opus alienum in the first place, since this attributes 
a contingent element to divine agency: if one wishes to categorize the divine act 
of wrath as a dei opus alienum in the way that Brunner does, one is committed to 
the proposition that the divine nature, impeded in its fundamental act of self-
expression (love) by human sin, is itself conditioned by the unfavorable human 
response to divine self-revelation to the extent that its agency acquires a completely 
different modality, a modality of exclusion (wrath), in which the divine nature qua 
self-impartative volition is radically subverted.  This leads one to enquire whether 
this is consistent with Brunner’s conception of God as “Absolute Subject.”118 This 
stands in tension with the doctrine of the immutability of God and thus runs 
directly counter to the biblical doctrine of God.119  Brunner attempts to reconcile 
this characterization of divine wrath with the immutability of God by adducing 
Luther’s claim that God “must make use of his sword...[to] crush those who try 
to resist his rule and his peaceful government, or to do harm to his people.  But 
in his hall and in his castle there is nothing but mercy and love.”120  However, for 
this characterization to be reconciled with the doctrine of the immutability of 
God, the act of wrath would have to constitute an expression of the modality of di-
vine agency as holiness attached to love and not a subversion of this modality.  We 
saw how Augustine obviated this problem by insisting that any language about 
wrath in God did not refer to God in himself but simply to the effect of divine 
providence upon his creatures, and Brunner’s radical departure from Augustine’s 
framework at this juncture means that it is a challenge for him to uphold the 
immutability of God, since God’s action without Jesus Christ is characterized as 
holiness which attaches itself to wrath rather than love, a self-disposition which by 
Brunner’s own argumentation can be seen to be inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal nature of God as self-giving love.
Ultimately, Brunner’s concept of the wrathful nature of the agency of the 
Father without Jesus Christ renders Brunner’s concept of God in revelation mean-
ingless.  Brunner states that “God the Father is really He who reveals Himself in 
117 Brunner, Dogmatics II, 120.
118 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 239.  One could theoretically answer that God has limited his 
power in creation (cf. Brunner, Dogmatics I, 251.), but I should note that, for Brunner, this self-limita-
tion originates in the nature of God himself and is not adscititiously imposed upon him—there is no 
sacrifice of the nature of God.
119 See Ps. 102: 27 & Mal. 3:6.
120 Luther in Brunner, Dogmatics I, 174.
Jesus Christ.  When Jesus Christ, in His Holy and Merciful authority, speaks to us 
as ‘I,’ the Holy and Merciful God Himself is really speaking to us.  God is the One 
who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ as the God for us.  The love of Jesus is really 
the love of God.  Thus God is not merely the Loving One in His relation to us, but 
in Himself He is Love.”121  However, in consideration both of his claims about the 
operational separation of the Father and the Son and of the wrathful modalization 
of the Father’s agency outside Jesus Christ, it is completely devoid of meaning to 
claim that “God the Father is really He who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ,” since 
it appears that God does not actually reveal himself (deus nudus) in Jesus Christ but 
rather a veiled, contingent modality of his nature (deus velatus).  Brunner criticizes 
Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination on the grounds that it means that we 
cannot worship God truly as the God of love,122 but it is debatable whether Brun-
ner’s articulation of the distinction of operations in the Trinity permits us to call 
the Father the God of love, since it appears that he is only the God of love when he 
is velatus in Jesus Christ.123
Brunner’s polarization of the modality of the agency of the Father acting 
with the Son against the modality of the agency of the Father acting alone also 
points to a soteriological problem of the utmost significance.  Brunner’s doctrine of 
God, by dividing the works of the Father from those of the Son, dissolves the onto-
logical unity of the Trinity and provides dogmatic theology no basis for reflection 
upon God as an integral subject.  This raises a serious concern, because Brunner 
claims that the call of humanity to Christian discipleship is a call to attain the in-
tegrity of its being: the fallen man, he writes, “misses his chance of achieving true 
humanity…for by missing his integration at the point where alone it can happen—
namely in the Word of God—he becomes disintegrated man, who has fallen both 
from his own wholeness and from fellowship…The man who is not founded in 
love is also unable to love, he must seek to achieve domination.”124  Here Brunner 
claims that the personal affirmation of Jesus Christ communicates two character-
121 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 227–228.
122 Brunner, Dogmatics I, 331.
123 Brunner derives most of his theological material in this context from Luther, and I suspect 
that Brunner’s primary weakness is his application of the doctrine of the deus absconditus to the 
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as “Absolute”, see Brunner, Dogmatics I, 171 & 187.  However, to proceed from this point of departure 
to the supposition that God is actually a wrathful God when he is encountered outside revelation is 
to transform an epistemological truth, a truth of subjective reason, into an ontological truth, a truth 
of objective reason, which is wholly unwarranted, and which, I hasten to add, radically contradicts 
Brunner’s hamartiologico-epistemological framework which denies that we can arrive at any truth 
about God without divine revelation: he writes that “the ascent of the soul to God is a false path, 
the itinerarium mentis in Deum does not end in the Living God, but in the abstract ens realissimum 
of Neoplatonist speculation; the true God can be known only by His coming down to us…rational 
knowledge itself does not give us any access to that Wisdom of God.”  Brunner, Revelation and Reason, 
319–321.
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istics to the human being: (1) integrity; and (2) love.  However, Brunner’s doctrine 
of the agentive separability of the Father and the Son, which implies the contin-
gent character of the agentive co-operation between the members of the Trinity, 
entails that, since the Trinity is not constituted integrally, it cannot conceivably 
be positioned to confer integrity upon human beings in the event of revelation.  
This also applies to love: if God is not really love in his primordial (nudus) state 
but only in his veiled (velatus) state, this necessitates the accidentalization of the 
love-modality of divine agency, which means that it is also meaningless to claim 
that God shares his being as love with us, for he is not primordially a loving being 
in the first place.
Incredibly, despite Brunner’s assertion that Calvin’s doctrine of double 
predestination does not enable us to confess the Father as a God of love, Calvin’s 
doctrine of double predestination may represent a more theologically satisfactory 
account of salvation and damnation, since in Calvin’s doctrine of double pre-
destination there is no implication of a fundamental discontinuity between the 
redemptive agency of God in Jesus Christ and the condemnatory agency of God 
outside Jesus Christ: all events are subject to divine providence, which is guided by 
divine love.  In his Institutes, Calvin insists that this providential concern includes 
God’s predestination of sinners to damnation, writing: “by God’s providence man 
has been created to undergo that calamity [of damnation].”125  By his providence, 
God “make[s] good even out of evil,”126 and divine providence does not operate 
solely to the benefit of the soi-disant ‘elect,’ but “strives to the end that God may 
reveal his concern for the whole human race”127: even in the mire of sin, death, and 
damnation, this divine providential grace is at work in the world, giving each crea-
ture the “impulsion” to act.128  Divine providence is not something which occurs 
only at certain junctures: it is “the determinative principle for all human works 
and plans,”129 precisely because God so loves the entire world and all the creatures 
within it that “it is his care to govern all creatures for their own good and safety, and 
even the devil himself.”130  This means, in accordance with Calvin’s providential 
doctrine of predestination, that even in the fires of hell, God’s dealings with the 
condemned in no wise imply that he ceases to love and to care for them: according 
to Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination, the condemnation of the reprobate 
is to be conceived as a function of this providential care.  None of this commits 
Calvin to the doctrine of universal salvation, but what it does is safeguard the 
integrity of God in his dealings with humanity: in accordance with Calvin’s posi-
tion, just because humanity turns against God in sin and refuses to accept his offer 
of fellowship, this does not mean that God, in the dealings he has with the fallen 
125 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Philadephia: Westminister Press, 1960), 
958.  Emphasis mine.
126 Calvin, Institutes, 235.
127 Calvin, Institutes, 210.
128 Calvin, Institutes, 232.
129 Calvin, Institutes, 232.
130 Calvin, Institutes, 219.  Emphasis mine.
creature who condemns himself, ceases to orchestrate his own agency in accor-
dance with his nature as love, even if God accepts the creature’s refusal to be elect.  
As Augustine states, the wrath of God “indicate[s] the effect of His vengeance, 
rather than any disturbance to which He is subject.”131  Accordingly, perhaps it would 
have been judicious for Brunner, in the articulation of his critique of the doctrine 
of universal salvation, not to have dismissed the contribution of Calvin’s doctrine 
of double predestination so precipitously.
conclusIon
In this article, I have exposited Emil Brunner’s approach to the question of 
universal salvation.  I have argued that Brunner’s position represents a clear inver-
sion of Augustine’s position: whereas Augustine accepts the concept of an invisible 
Church, but rejects the possibility of universal salvation, Brunner insists upon the 
concrete historicity of Christian faith whilst remaining open to the possibility of 
universal salvation.  I have drawn attention to the principal objections Brunner 
has lodged against the doctrine of universal salvation, suggesting that several of 
them are radically inconsistent with the theological method he himself proposes.132 
Furthermore, I have argued that Brunner’s doctrine of the agentive separability of 
the Father from the Son generates serious problems for his doctrine of God which 
may not have arisen if he had drawn upon the providential foundation of Calvin’s 
doctrine of double predestination.
131 Augustine, City of God, 366.
132 I have done so without overtly endorsing either the objections or the theological method: 
my intent here was merely to draw attention to the logical relation between these two elements, and a 
treatment of the cogency of Brunner’s theological method will have to wait for another occasion.
